

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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June 10, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary

FROM: PM - Reginald Bartholomew

SUBJECT: Your Luncheon Meeting with Secretary Brown and

Dr. Brzezinski, Wednesday, June 11th

1. Policy Statement on SALT II: At Tab 1 is the latest draft of the SALT policy statement which the President last Friday asked be done. The three of you will want to review this paper before it goes forward to the President.

2. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Proposal: We understand Harold wants to raise the subject of Gerry Smith's proposals to improve the non-proliferation regime. Background and talking points at Tab 2, As are even "Coaring treat Lagrage meno"

3. SecNav Hidalgo's Latin American Trip: Secretary of the Navy and Mrs. Hidalgo will visit Latin America June 28-July 9. You told the President on June 5 you did not believe it appropriate for a visit to Chile or Argentina at this time given our current posture toward Chile. Although the PRC has directed improvement in our relations with Argentina, a keynote of that effort will be Assistant Secretary Bowdler's visit in late July. A visit by Hidalgo before Bowdler would seriously lessen the impact we hope for, especially as there already have been several high level visitors this year.

We have already approved Secretary Hidalgo's plans to visit Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, and Brazil. Either Colombia or Peru, both important democratic countries with sizeable maritime interests, could be substituted for Argentina and Chile. We would also recommend Secretary Hidalgo add the Dominican Republic to his trip as an indicator of high-level US interest and support for Caribbean security.

4. SecDef's Hill Consultations on F-15 Related Items for Saudis: We understand Zbig will ask Harold to review his consultations with Senator Byrd on the F-15 related items the Saudis have asked for. Harold has spoken to Byrd about conformal fuel pods and tankers and Byrd reportedly had no objection but suggested that we consult widely and obtain general congressional agreement.

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Harold is scheduled to meet Sultan on June 26. We understand he now intends to hear Sultan out on the F-15 items, make no commitments, but make some positive noises about proceeding in January with pods and tankers.

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PM and NEA believe Harold should give a positive signal about consulting Congress this year on the pods. H disagrees, believing we should not reopen this issue with the Congress this year. We do not believe Harold should be positive on the tankers, which raise major political and absorptive problems (we have refused jet tanker capability to Israel). Instead he should encourage Sultan in the belief that the pods provide the optimal method of increasing the range of the F-15s. Similarly, we should not make any undertaking at this time with respect to Multiple Ejection Bomb Racks (MERs), but should indicate we will consider that request later, in light of the Congressional response we receive on the pods.

Apparently Harold has not focussed on the AIM-9L Sidewinder which incorporates sensitive technology, but is not covered by congressional assurances and has been sold to Israel. We believe Harold should be authorized to agree in principle to sale of this item.

More detail is contained in the attachment at Tab 3.

- 5. Wilson Article on Iran Hostages: You wanted to discuss the Wilson article in the Tuesday Post which talks about ongoing plans for rescue of the hostages. The article is at Tab 4.
- 6. Energy as a National Security Issue at the Summit:
 Harold has sent over a paper urging that energy be dealt with at
 the Venice Summit as a national security issue. See Harold's
 and our paper at Tab 5.
- 7. Schmidt Speech in Essen: Schmidt may have done it to us again on TNF with a speech in Essen in which he called for NATO and the Soviets to mutually refrain from TNF deployments for the next three years. Zbig plans to have a Presidential letter ready for the three of you to review at the MBB. The letter will contain the threat of an explicit public dissociation from Schmidt's proposals unless he backs off. While we think a letter may be a good idea, we believe you should tell Zbig you will want to have the letter reviewed and will get back to him soon with our comments after we have had a chance to read the text of Schmidt's speech.
- 8. Friedrich Ebert Workshop on Security Issues in Bonn: We understand Zbig may want to raise this issue in the context of having an appropriate American representation to match the

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high level German group which will be present. If current plans hold the US will be represented by David Aaron, Paul Warnke, and John Newhouse, among others.

- ASAT: The talks have been in recess since June 1, 1979. It is clear on the basis of today's (Tuesday's) mini-SCC that we could get out instructions that would allow for progress if a new round were held. Thus the issue now is whether to propose resumption of the talks. This issue has two essentially political dimensions: a) our arms control interests and the possible political advantage of a visible reaffirmation this summer of our commitment to continue arms control that serves our security interests; b) the risks that an initiative on ASAT would undercut our post-Afghanistan objectives by signalling to the Soviets, the Allies or others a step towards business-asusual with the Soviets. I think this is a close call, but a case can be made for trying it (see Tab 6). This is one for you, Harold and Zbiq to discuss and for the President ultimately to decide. If the decision is to go ahead, then we need to schedule an early SCC and inform the Soviets we want to schedule a round this summer--both before your departure for Venice if possible.
 - 10. Romania: Military Supply Relationship: See paper at Tab 7.
- 11. Extension of US MILGRP Commander in Liberia: Col.Gosney:
 We understand that Brzezinski will raise the extension of Colonel
 Gosney as head of the US Military Mission in Liberia. Colonel
 Gosney has been in Liberia for several years and has earned the
 respect of Liberian officers and enlisted men. We believe the
 State Department should support this extension.

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12. York Letter: Harold has sent for your eyes only a letter he recently received from Herb York (Tab 8). York describes his recent discussion with the Pope about arms control. He argues that the grim outlook for arms control agreements in the immediate future makes it important to engage the Pope and other moral leaders in arms control to keep general public interest from dying out.

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